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 MR. SOVEN: We are going to move to what 
really makes up the bulk of the competition work out 
there, which is mergers.  Of course, over the last few 
days there has been a lot hubbub and highlight and 
noise and discussion about the dominance and abuse of 
dominance by four or five large technology companies, 
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but the fact of the matter is the bulk of the work on 
the ground overwhelmingly is in mergers.  Those take 
up the bulk of the resources in the antitrust agencies 
throughout the world, they take up the bulk of the 
work in law firms and competition outfits and 
consulting firms throughout the world, and they take 
up the bulk of the competition resources in companies. 
We are very privileged today to have a 
fantastic panel to dive into what really is leading-
edge stuff that is not old but quite new. 
Very briefly, I’m Josh Soven.  I am a 
Partner at Wilson Sonsini.  Before that, I spent a 
bunch of time at the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Justice Department.   
But, far more important than me, let me 
introduce our panelists are. Isabelle de Silva, who is 
the President of the French Competition Authority.  
Isabelle, my children speak accent-free French, but I 
do not, so I will not make an attempt at the French.  
Daniel Francis is the Deputy Director of the Bureau of 
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Competition at the FTC and has also held a number of 
positions there.  Bruce Hoffman, a partner at Cleary 
Gottlieb, before that was Daniel’s boss in some sense 
as the Director of the Bureau of Competition.  Axel 
Schulz is a Partner at White & Case. 
One of the fantastic things about Fordham — 
and I think I am certainly privileged to speak here 
because of it — is, unlike so many conferences, it 
does not center around six square blocks in 
Washington, D.C.; it covers a lot of ground beyond 
that. 
In that spirit, we are going to kick it off 
with Isabelle, and I am going to try to manage the 
topics and keep us on the road but otherwise be a good 
moderator and get out of the way. 
Isabelle, the French Competition Authority 
has recently issued some new merger guidelines.  Why 
don’t you go ahead and tell us what is new, what’s not 
so new, and generally how you are thinking about 
merger policy as we keep moving into the 21st century? 
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MS. DE SILVA:  Thank you, and hello to 
everyone.  I am glad to be at Fordham for this event. 
The new merger guidelines that we published 
very recently are part of the major overhaul that we 
did of the merger procedure in France.  Three years 
ago, we started a consultation with stakeholders to 
ask them about whether the merger thresholds were 
appropriate, whether the substance should be reviewed, 
and whether the process could be improved.  In this 
process we proposed an important number of changes. 
The first change was to ask companies for 
less information for their merger filings.  The first 
part was the simplification of the information 
request, which was introduced by a decree in our law. 
The second thing was to expand the scope of 
the simplified procedure, and also, in addition to 
that, the creation of a fully online notifying 
procedure for the simplest mergers. 
Another part was about substance, whether 
the national framework was appropriate, considering 
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the changes we have in the merger landscape, so we 
decided that it was not appropriate to introduce new 
value transaction thresholds, like Germany and Austria 
have done recently.  We felt that it was more 
appropriate to have a new form of targeted merger 
control to catch those transactions that have a very 
strong competitive impact.  I will come back to this 
when we talk about the Article 22 of the 2004 
Regulation, news that had been announced by Margrethe 
Vestager a few days ago. 
What about those new merger guidelines?  It 
was a lot of work because we decided to take into 
account ten years of application of the law to mergers 
in France.  What we tried to do was, first, to make 
those guidelines very informative, even more so than 
they used to be, by introducing all the big decisions 
that companies must take into account, trying to help 
them to prepare their cases for the Authority. 
What is new in substance in those 
guidelines? 
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First, we decided to devote quite some time 
to the issue of procedural infringements.  As you may 
know, we had a big case concerning gun-jumping in 
France three years ago where we issued a €80 million 
fine to Altice, a company that had implemented the 
merger too soon.  So we really devoted quite some 
effort in the guidelines to explain to companies how 
they can avoid receiving such a fine and going into 
conduct that might be considered as gun-jumping: for 
example, how they use “clean teams” when they are 
preparing for the merger; or how can they use 
covenants without infringing our law; or another 
example, how they can concretely continue to act as 
competitors until the day when we finally approve the 
merger. 
Another issue that is quite important is 
commitment.  We take commitment very seriously.  We 
recently issued a €20 million fine to Fnac Darty, a 
company that had failed to sell some of its 
subsidiaries it was compelled to sell in the merger 
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decision.  In the guidelines we make an overview of 
all the jurisprudence about commitments and how they 
must be applied. 
Another chapter that we developed quite a 
lot in those new guidelines concerns the issue of 
digital and online retail, how it affects our analysis 
when we have to look at mergers that involve 
distributors and how do we compare the market power of 
companies with their shops and online.  So we have in 
the guidelines a very precise methodology that 
explains how we take into account online sales in the 
retail sector.   
That is what is new.   
Maybe one last point is the issue of the 
timeframe that we take into account.  As you know, 
classically the Commission and the French Authority 
take into account what is going to happen in the two 
years after the merger.  It has been debated whether 
this two-year reference was appropriate considering 
the profound digital changes, for example in the 
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digital economy.  We developed this part of the new 
merger guidelines to say which are the cases in which 
we could take into account some more years when we try 
to forecast what the effect of the merger will be. 
Maybe a final word.  This document is now 
ready and is applicable, but we also have a very 
important exercise that is going on within the 
European Competition Network, which is the revision of 
the EU Market Definition Notice.  This is a document 
that dates back to 1997 and now really needs a 
complete update to take into account the digital 
economy.  When this work is finished in the next few 
months, I think that we will have a good setup at the 
national and European level especially to take into 
account all the changes that we have known in the 
digital economy. 
Thank you. 
MR. SOVEN:  Great.  Time permitting, I am 
going to come back with a whole bunch of questions, 
which I haven’t told the panelists I am going to ask 
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but we will give it a shot anyway. 
In the meantime, Axel — you are on the 
ground — what is your reaction based on Isabelle’s 
excellent overview?  I hear a lot of change, and a lot 
of change that could hit the ground really quickly. 
MR. SCHULZ:  Yes, it seems like it.  To be 
honest, I have not read the guidelines in detail, but 
from what I have heard from Isabelle right now, it 
does indeed seem to reflect the very excellent 
practice of the French Competition Authority over the 
years.   
She mentioned Altice, which was obviously a 
big bang in Europe, and companies are quite nervous 
about what they can do and what they cannot do.  And I 
know that there was already — I think two years ago 
maybe — a paper which was published by the Authority 
on this particular point, so I assume that has been 
now lifted over into the guidelines. 
Also, I think the French Authority, probably 
together with the German Authority, has been one of 
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the two authorities in Europe looking really at the 
digital retail market, the other one being the German 
Authority that has been occasionally divergent, with 
different views — “Can I block my retailer from sales 
on Amazon or not?,” this kind of question — so I am 
curious to see what the guidelines say there.  But 
again, I assume that they will reflect what the case 
law in France has provided in the last few years.  So 
it is probably quite an interesting read. 
I have also seen that you had your first 
merger decision which blocked a case.  Is that right? 
MS. DE SILVA:  Yes.  This was a first for 
the French Authority.  The case we blocked was a 
three-to-two merger in a local retail distribution 
case that went to Phase II.  The case was interesting 
because we really used all our toolkit to have a very 
refined evaluation of how this merger would impact the 
local customers. 
In a way, it is surprising that it took us 
ten years to say no to a merger, but in reality, as 
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you practitioners know, many deals are abandoned in 
the last run when the companies feel that the 
Authority does not see an easy way out for the merger. 
Maybe another case that is interesting to 
mention was just a few weeks before that decision we 
were on the verge of saying no to a big merger that 
was leading to taking the control of an oil pipeline 
which is restructuring in France.  This could have 
been another first merger decision that could end with 
a prohibition. 
It is interesting to see that, at least in 
France, not many companies take the risk of going to 
the final prohibition decision and try to challenge 
them in court.  I don’t know if they feel that they 
would lose anyway, but we do not have that many 
decisions that have gone to court after a prohibition. 
So maybe this could be the first one. 
MR. SOVEN:  I think there are a couple of 
ways to think about that.  You can think about it as 
“Well, look, the enforcement process is efficient in 
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that it is reaching resolution where people really 
understand what is going on.”  On the other hand, you 
could say, “Well, maybe at times the risks, the 
transaction costs, are so great that procompetitive 
mergers, or ones where there are reasonable bases for 
argument, might be getting stopped when they shouldn’t 
be.”  We can come back to that. 
Axel, as Isabelle noted and as you alluded 
to, Brussels — post-Brexit or pre-Brexit, it doesn’t 
seem to matter — is quite active.   
Commissioner Vestager is making news quite 
often, which is appropriate for the time.  She 
delivered what I think many view as a seminal or 
foundational speech in September of this year.  A lot 
to digest there.  Why don’t you give us your take on 
that? 
MR. SCHULZ:  Indeed, it was a very 
interesting speech, and it did mark the existence of 
thirty years of the European Merger Regulation, and so 
it was obviously quite well timed. 
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First of all, apart from her speech, I think 
the good news is that, following the first few weeks 
of the Covid-19 lockdown in Brussels, things are 
totally back to normal.  Things are proceeding 
perfectly, I think, between the European Commission 
and the practitioners. That is something I just wanted 
to mention. 
Back to Commissioner Vestager’s speech.  
After thirty years of the Merger Regulation, she did 
make the point that merger enforcement is as important 
as ever, if not even more important.  She referred 
back to the 1930s, the Great Depression in the United 
States — and I didn’t know that before reading her 
speech — when the rules for merger control were 
relaxed in the United States, and apparently this 
didn’t quite help the economy come back into shape 
after the Great Depression. 
She said that we definitely need to have 
merger control enforcement even today, even if we are 
going through probably the biggest recession certainly 
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of our careers. 
I want to pick out two points, and I think 
we will come back to the topic of nascent competition 
on substance. 
One thing that she discussed was: Are we 
managing currently to pick up cases that fly under the 
radar; how are we doing this?  Isabelle also said that 
when they looked at their guidelines, they decided not 
to impose or adopt value-based thresholds, as in 
Germany and Austria.  The same is true for the 
European Commission and the Merger Regulation, which 
do not have value-based thresholds. 
But the problem of nascent competition, or 
killer acquisitions, or whatever you call it, is 
there.  In cases where established companies merge and 
the Commission sees that some products are in the 
pipeline and maybe one of the two companies would stop 
the innovation in their pipeline and only proceed with 
one of the innovations, that is okay; these cases can 
be picked up when we are talking about established 
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companies, like big pharma companies, because 
somewhere chances are that the turnover thresholds are 
met. 
The problem is for the regulators: How do we 
pick up cases where the target companies have no 
turnover? 
One solution was, as adopted in Germany and 
Austria a few years ago, to have a value-based 
threshold, like in the USSR.  The Commission had 
looked at this a few years ago in Commissioner 
Vestager’s first time, and she wasn’t convinced, I 
believe.  And even this time around that is not what 
the Commission wants to do. 
So what is the solution for the Commission?  
Isabelle mentioned this as well already. Article 22, 
which has always been in the Merger Regulation, a 
referral system, whereby Member State authorities can 
refer a case to the European Commission.  That is all 
fine if the threshold or the test at the national 
level is met.  Then there is jurisdiction in a given 
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Member State and that Member State can refer the case 
up to the European Commission. 
Now the suggestion is that cases could also 
be referred up to the Commission by Member States 
where the international test is not met.  And yes, 
there have been cases very early on in the life of the 
Merger Regulation where some Member States did not 
have a merger control system yet and they thought, 
This case really should be looked at by someone.  We 
can’t do it, so let’s refer it to the European 
Commission.  But this was really thirty or twenty-five 
years ago. 
So the big question is really now in my 
view: Is this a practical solution or does this create 
a huge legal uncertainty?  That is to be debated. 
The Commission has said they will issue 
guidelines.  I wonder whether guidelines can establish 
a legal requirement to make a notification.  That is 
to be discussed, but this is certainly an interesting 
point and I think we will come back to that many 
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times. 
The other thing that she said is very 
welcome actually.  She talked about simplification.  
In a way — never waste a good crisis — in Europe it is 
actually very hard to get on the clock.  You see this 
often, all of you, when you advise companies when you 
have to do a filing in the United States and a filing 
in Europe: it is always the case that within weeks the 
HSR filing goes in and half a year later we are still 
in prenotification in Brussels.  It is a thing that 
creates tension.  
I always thought somewhere things can be 
held back.  I think now the Commission is now also 
warming to this again, trying to somehow simplify 
again the simplified procedure, which is very good, 
but over the years it became not so simple anymore to 
follow the simplified rules.  There were still rounds 
of prenotifications, RFIs; have you captured all 
market shares under any plausible market definition? 
This is a very plausible [inaudible] — an alien word 
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in Brussels — and hopefully we can simplify this 
again. 
Also, do we need prenotifications in every 
case?  Commissioner Vestager now suggests maybe not 
and they should look into that.  Again, there are a 
number of jurisdictions out there, including Germany 
for example — I’m not actually sure about France, but 
certainly in Germany 80 percent of the cases go in 
without a prenotification, and I think nobody would 
suggest there is underenforcement in Germany. 
So these are welcome things.  There isn’t 
anything concrete.   
Maybe one idea from me would be to increase 
the market share threshold for what amounts to an 
“affected market” — so maybe you go up a little bit 
from 20 percent to 25-30 percent — maybe coupled with 
a small incremental market share, so a combined market 
share of 30 percent.  If the increase is only 2 
percent, that could still be an unaffected market and 
it would make life easier for many people. 
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That is a very welcome development, I think, 
but we will see exactly how the Commission will 
address these points. 
So, hopefully, this is good in Brussels and 
we can simplify it again.  
I will stop here. 
MR. SOVEN:  That was great, Axel.  Thanks. 
One quick note.  I have been notified that I 
have committed the cardinal sin of any moderator, 
which is I have not announced the CLE code, and I am 
required by law to do that twice. Very briefly, before 
I turn it back to Isabelle, it is MIGP20. 
Isabelle, a lot there.  I will pick out my 
favorites, but since you are the president of a 
competition authority, you should certainly pick up on 
what you want. 
The issue of referrals and who is doing what 
and what we’re looking at and what we’re not looking 
at, at least on the U.S. side, it seems like there is 
a lot to unpack there and it is a challenge to advise 
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clients. 
MRS. DE SILVA: Thank you, Josh, and thank 
you, Axel. 
I received with great enthusiasm the 
announcement by Margrethe Vestager that the European 
Commission is willing to reconsider its traditional 
interpretation of Article 22.  We have now advocated 
for some time, a few years now, the fact that there 
was a loophole in the merger regime in Europe at the 
national level, because such transactions as 
Facebook/WhatsApp or Facebook/Instagram, even 
transactions that are not in the digital sphere but 
come in the biotech industry, can have a profound 
impact on the market and the target may have no 
turnover at all or a turnover that is below the 
threshold.   
So we really felt that there was something 
that was lacking.  It might be only one or two mergers 
that we miss every year, but those mergers might be 
crucial and might completely redefine the dynamics of 
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the market. 
I think that the solution of coming back to 
the roots of Article 22 to its letter and to its 
objective is the best one because this means that we 
do not have to open Regulation 2004; we have already 
the text to apply.   
Of course, this is something that is met 
with skepticism or anxiety by businesses and counsel.  
When we had the consultations with those people at the 
national level, our competition lawyers’ association 
and business organizations were quite skeptical or 
reluctant about this change, even though a few major 
companies advocated such a change. 
I think that now the next step will be to 
have a guidance about which are the types of mergers 
we might look into through this new interpretation of 
Article 22.   
In my view, this is not something that 
should be limited to digital.  It might also have an 
interest to make sure that some dominant companies are 
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not allowed to buy their last competitors and to 
completely stifle competition in their market. 
I think that now we have a few months ahead 
of us to discuss which could be the priorities and how 
would it work quite practically.  We know how to do 
referrals; this is something that is quite common in 
the European Competition Network.  I think it is a 
good time to have a discussion at the level of the 
European Competition Network, but also of course with 
businesses and lawyers, to make sure that there is not 
the sort of incertitude that hampers deals that should 
never be subject to that procedure. 
I think that with a lot of explanation and 
discussion we will be able to alleviate those fears 
and be able to catch those mergers that are of 
critical importance.  It is not only about what we 
might call killer acquisitions; it is also about 
acquisitions where the target is not killed at all but 
it comes and reinforces the dominant company’s 
strength or the value of the companies that decided to 
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merge. 
I will stop there, not to be too long on 
this topic, on which I could speak a lot. 
MR. SOVEN:  Daniel, a lot to choose from 
there.  I know U.S. competition authorities are 
appropriately discreet and measured and everyone has 
to think about which parts of the foreign competition 
landscape or international competition landscape they 
want to comment on and which parts they don’t.  Why 
don’t you pick out a few “greatest hits” of what you 
are hearing from Europe? 
MR. FRANCIS:  That sounds great, Josh.  
Thank you. 
Let me start by keeping myself out of FTC 
jail: everything I am going to say today is on my own 
account; I am not speaking for the Commission or for 
any individual Commissioner.  I don’t know how we do 
the FTC dungeon when we are working from home, but I 
am sure it won’t be pleasant. 
Let me just pick a couple things to respond 
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to, and maybe I will say something about the themes of 
what I thought was a terrific speech and then just 
touch briefly on a couple points of substance. 
I took some of the themes in the 
Commissioner’s speech to really touch on things that I 
think all of us antitrust enforcers around the world 
are focused on a lot at the moment, including but not 
limited to digital enforcement. 
First, what I really took to be a kind of 
framing observation or a framing impetus for a lot of 
the Commissioner’s remarks, was response to fast-
changing markets and how antitrust enforcers should 
respond to change and to the uncertainty that it 
creates. 
On that, I will just say that I think our 
answer to that question, our institutional response — 
and to preview something we might talk about later, 
the response of courts — to the fact of rapid 
competitive change and the uncertainty that it 
generates in some of the things that are very 
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important to our everyday work will probably have, 
perhaps more than anything else, to say about how our 
antitrust system responds to what we sometimes call 
the digital economy. 
That is as true for competitively 
significant acquisitions.  I notice that Isabelle is a 
fellow warrior in the fight to keep the term “killer 
acquisition” applied to the specific context of a 
target that is where the product or service is shelved 
— but it is true in potential and nascent competition 
cases as well.  So we are thinking about those things 
also. 
The second theme that I took from her speech 
was that the Commission is pursuing its effort to 
focus antitrust enforcement on what really matters to 
competition, and not treating all things alike but 
responding to what in particular in some individual 
case or some individual market affects competition. 
I thought those themes resonated a lot with 
a lot of what we are thinking about and what I know is 
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on the mind of other enforcers as well.   
Let me just say a couple things about some 
of the substantive developments. 
The first is obviously thresholds and 
notification thresholds.  This is a sort of hot-button 
issue around the world.  We, of course, are thinking 
very hard, including but not limited to in our 
hearings last year and year before and in some of our 
internal reflections since then, about the 
consequences and the limits of our merger notification 
system. 
If you think of antitrust in general, and 
perhaps digital antitrust in particular, as a 
knowledge problem, then Hart-Scott-Rodino notification 
is a critical tool for generating that knowledge and 
bringing it to us. 
One way in which we are trying to think 
about that is through our current 6(b) study.  In 
February of this year, we issued an order to some 
large technology platforms in an effort to understand 
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the nature and competitive implications of some of 
their nonreportable acquisitions.  That is one way in 
which we at least are grappling with some of the same 
questions. 
The one response that I would offer is I 
don’t think any notification system is ever going to 
be the whole answer.  We will never have a merger 
notification system of any kind — we will never find a 
magic answer to these thresholds, whether it’s size of 
person, size of deal, or something else — that 
captures all competitively troubling acquisitions and 
is workable for agencies and for the parties.   
That to my mind begs the questions not just 
of what the thresholds should do in isolation, but 
what else matters.  I think there are critical roles 
to be played — to touch on the second thing that I 
will come to in a second — by other enforcers, 
including particularly State AGs in the United States 
and national authorities in Europe, to bring matters, 
to act as sort of knowledge generators for the center, 
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to bring matters to their attention. 
And then for the agencies to develop robust 
channels to the market, to hear from competitors, 
ultimately even from consumers themselves, in ways 
that can put things on our radar.  I think that kind 
of thing is always going to be a critical complement 
to merger notification. 
Obviously, the other big-ticket item is the 
referrals from the national agencies.  We of course do 
not have that, but we do have State Attorneys General.  
We find consistently that they are a critical part of 
what we do.  We actually just last week finished 
trying a case in Philadelphia alongside the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General.  We are currently suing 
Vyera Pharmaceuticals with New York and six other 
states.  We find them to be both a source of cases and 
referral in exactly this way and really significant 
support on the cases that we do bring. 
All things considered, I thought it was  
wonderful speech and it really sounded themes that are 
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front and center of mind for us, and that I think 
signal a series of very promising developments both in 
Europe and over here. 
MR. SOVEN:  Fantastic.  That was very 
helpful. 
We are going to go about 3000 miles west, 
having stayed away from D.C. for a while, we will 
pivot back to D.C. and the East Coast of the United 
States and the United States as a whole. 
Bruce, if you haven’t noticed — and for 
those who haven’t noticed — we are in a political 
season here in the United States.   
MR.  HOFFMAN:  What?!? 
MR. SOVEN:  Exactly. At least in 
conventional times — and who knows if these times are 
conventional or not — this is the time in any 
administration where both the people who work or 
worked in the administration and those outside are 
looking at the box score; taking stock; seeing what 
was done, what was not done.  Those who are perhaps 
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angling for some new things would say, “Well, nothing 
was done,” and those who are there correctly point 
out, “Look, an awful lot was done.” 
For what it’s worth, as a personal note, I 
worked for lots of different people of lots of 
different persuasions at both agencies, and I always 
saw them do it straight-up and never turn down a case 
that people thought was the right case to bring. 
But you were on the front lines for thirty-
six months, running half the COO operation of the U.S. 
antitrust agencies.  What is your take on what 
happened in this Administration? 
MR. HOFFMAN: Thanks, Josh, and thanks to 
everybody, and thanks very much for the opportunity 
from Fordham and the various sponsors for me to join 
this panel.  It has been a lot of fun to listen to so 
far.  The prior panel was really good also.  I think 
we have a lot to talk about. 
Before I answer your question, Josh, I want 
to make one quick point about something that Daniel 
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touched on and that Axel and Isabelle both mentioned. 
I think it’s right when you say, “Well, 
thing are changing quickly; therefore, something needs 
to happen quickly.”  As the pace of competition picks 
up, as the pace of innovation picks up, antitrust has 
to respond in some way. 
Exactly the same thing was said in the late 
1990s, by the way, in almost literally exactly the 
same words, about dot-com and so forth.  So this is 
not a new thing.  This is a recurrent, every ten- or 
fifteen- or twenty-year kind of cycle, where we hear 
this. 
But I do think there is real room for 
caution about the idea that because the industrial 
landscape writ large, the economic landscape writ 
large, is changing really fast, we therefore need to 
regulate more or restrict more.  I do not think that 
is likely a good policy decision, and I also think it 
is very unlikely in the United States — to touch on a 
point that, as Daniel said, we’ll come to a little bit 
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later — I think that kind of notion is not likely to 
receive a sympathetic audience in the courts. 
Turning from that to the question you asked, 
just in terms of box scores, there is a narrative out 
there — this is sort of a constant media narrative — 
that whenever there are Republican administrations 
there is less enforcement and whenever there are 
Democratic administrations there is more.  The same 
has been said about the last now closing in on four 
years.  There is the narrative out there that there 
was less enforcement, and in fact there have been some 
pretty poor analyses statistical analyses that have 
tried to show that, although they do that in 
statistically unsound ways.  We’ve actually looked at 
this pretty closely. 
I’ll talk about the announcement that Ian 
Conner made a couple days ago about it.  You see 
enforcement, but what you find is that there is no 
evidence of any kind of decline in enforcement.  It is 
actually pretty steady in merger enforcement as 
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between the Obama terms — particularly the second 
term, which is closer in time and probably more 
relevant — and the last four years. 
For example, in the second term of the Obama 
Administration, the two agencies together had an 
average of forty enforcement actions each year; in 
three years of the Trump Administration, the two 
agencies together averaged forty enforcement actions 
per year in mergers.  That average is actually going 
to climb, I think, because of the FTC’s phenomenally 
busy last fiscal year, where there were twenty-eight 
merger enforcement actions brought, which is, I 
believe, the highest since 2001.  But I do not have 
the comparable stats for DOJ over the last fiscal year 
so I do not know what the net average will be. 
Another metric you could look at is 
litigation.  During the four years of the second Obama 
term, the two agencies initiated a total of twenty-two 
merger litigations.  By that I mean filing litigation 
to block a merger where there was not a settlement.  
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The case is filed — and sometimes parties abandon when 
that happens; sometimes they actually litigate; who 
knows? — but there were twenty-two such cases during 
the four years of the second-term Obama 
Administration. 
There were twenty-two such cases during 
three-plus years of the Trump Administration.  Again, 
this does not include the last fiscal year.  That is 
exactly the same number although over a shorter 
period. 
You do see a difference.  Under the second-
term Obama Administration, there were twelve FTC 
merger litigations and ten at DOJ.  In the first three 
years of the current Administration, there were 
sixteen FTC merger litigations and six from the DOJ.  
I do not know, though, if that actually reflects any 
kind of statistically valid difference.   
You are getting into such a small set of 
numbers when you’re talking twenty-some-odd litigation 
cases that small changes in case mix — the things that 
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are presented to you — could actually produce changes 
on the margin.  You know, one or two fewer cases or 
one or two more cases move the needle when you are 
this level.   
But certainly, when you look at the number 
of litigations, the level of enforcement activity, 
there is absolutely no support for the notion that 
enforcement is down. In fact, I think likely we will 
conclude when we look at the current statistics that 
enforcement is up relatively speaking, at least in a 
small way.   
I think that is consistent with the 
experience of people who have been in front of the 
agencies.  I think that you have seen a lot of 
aggressive cases.  The FTC has brought a number of 
challenges to five-to-four and six-to-five mergers — 
not always successfully, but quite aggressively.   
DOJ has brought fewer litigations, but it 
has brought some big ones and some pretty risky and 
daring ones, including the ATT/Time Warner case and 
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the Sabre/Farelogix case, where there were pretty 
unusual theories that were brought to bear and pursued 
in actual litigation. 
So, just in terms of the overall track 
record — and I think this is important from a client 
perspective to understand — you are not looking at an 
environment where enforcement is down — quite the 
contrary — and there is no reason to think that is 
going to change in any material way. 
MR. SOVEN:  I think that’s right.  If you 
look at the second request issuance data, it is 
really, really consistent. 
I should also point out it is certainly true 
that Republican administrations have been critiqued 
for supposedly taking their foot off the gas pedal a 
bit, but also, honestly, in the last week people on 
both the left and the right have been critiquing some 
of the no decisions of the Obama Administration.  A 
lot of this just depends on where you sit at the time 
and whether you want to look back or look forward. 
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Axel, let me put a completely unfair 
question to you:  From your perspective, has Bruce got 
it right in characterizing what has really been sort 
of the consensus landscape when you push out the 
rhetoric of what is going on in the United States, or 
are we in fact missing some cases that from the 
European vantage point should be brought? 
MR. SCHULZ:  I agree it is a little unfair 
question, but that’s fine. 
I really can just make some comments on some 
anecdotal evidence.  I have been doing this now for a 
few years, and I do not see a big difference at the 
enforcement level during the Obama or the Trump 
administrations.   
I have had the honor of being involved under 
the Obama Administration in the first ever vertical 
merger for twenty years.  That was surprising.  That 
was clearly important, and everybody said, “Okay, 
sure, under Obama what do you expect?” 
At the same time, recently I was involved in 
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a case where the FTC had looked at and was assessing 
non-overlapping products.   
But really I do not see a big difference in 
terms of the enforcement level of four or five years 
ago to today.  But again, this is just anecdotal 
experience.   
We have been discussing how to solve the 
riddle for the authorities to pick up cases which they 
think are important.  At the moment that is difficult 
because either you meet the threshold or you do not; 
you meet the test or you don’t.  It is not really pick 
and choose for the authorities at the moment.  They 
have to do whatever comes in.  At the moment I find it 
is a little bit tricky for enforcement authorities. 
MR. SOVEN: That is a great point.  It’s a 
really relevant point that sometimes gets lost.  There 
is a clamor for a certain type of case — and maybe it 
is the right type of case and maybe it is not — but 
either no one has proposed that sort of merger or no 
one has engaged in that sort of conduct, which makes 
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it awfully difficult for competition authorities 
throughout the world to bring that case when it is not 
in front of them. 
MR. SCHULZ: Of course this will all change 
now in Europe with Article 22. 
MR. SOVEN:  That could be.  Sometimes you 
can create demand by generating supply, or something 
like that, even at the government level. 
Let’s stick with the United States a little 
bit more to kind of pivot from what Bruce was talking 
about.  As Bruce said, the antitrust agencies, rightly 
or wrongly, have brought some pretty high-profile, 
daring stuff both at the federal level — the FTC’s 
Chemicals case; the DOJ’s ATT/Time Warner and the 
Sabre/Farelogix case — and the state level. I spent 
the last two years working closely with the states 
collaboratively on T-Mobile/Sprint, which had its own 
sort of novel aspect to it. 
Daniel, people are understandably asking, 
“Well, were those relatively few government losses the 
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results of judges just not getting it and missing and 
sidestepping what are perfectly valid 21st-century 
theories; or is the reason the outcomes were averse to 
the government that the theories were in fact novel 
and wrong and/or the facts did not really support it?   
A lot there, Daniel, but you think about 
these things, so what’s up? 
MR. FRANCIS:  There is a lot there for sure. 
I am also aware that I should try to be as brief as 
possible given that we have our nascent competition 
theme that we keep alluding to and I do not want to 
hold up that discussion.  But let me try to say a 
couple things. 
The first is just a more general 
institutional observation — really, by footnote, 
agreeing with Bruce — and point out a couple of 
examples, including the ones that you mentioned. 
As you know, and as Bruce alluded to, there 
are a lot of calls at the minute for increased agency 
action by the FTC as well as DOJ and states and 
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others.  I will say a couple of things about that. 
Number one, just subjectively, my lived 
experience of being there is that everyone is working 
all the way around the clock and, as Bruce mentioned, 
the numbers really support that.  I really think this 
fiscal year has seen more merger enforcement actions 
than in any fiscal year in the last twenty.  So, 
number one, I would say the agencies, to agree with 
Bruce, are very active. 
Number two, the piece that gets left out of 
the discussion a lot but which you touched on in your 
question, our merger enforcement system requires us to 
bring and prove cases not just before neutral 
adjudicators but before neutral non-specialist 
adjudicators.  Sometimes that piece of the enforcement 
architecture gets left out of the discussion of what 
the agencies are doing, can do, and should do. 
I wouldn’t want to suggest for a minute that 
the agencies abdicate to courts.  I think we have a 
long track record of developing the law and pushing 
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for change in the law when we think the courts are 
wrong. I think that happened with hospital mergers; I 
think it happened with reverse payments; I think it 
happened with state action — there is a pretty long 
and quite distinguished list of issues where the 
agencies have really pushed back on court decisions 
that had it wrong. 
But I also think that we should be very 
clear about the fact that what courts do is and should 
be a real decision.  Antitrust enforcement is in very 
significant measure an exercise in allocating very 
scarce enforcement resources, people and dollars, and 
if the things we think about — you know, we think 
about the impact of bringing a particular case, but we 
also think about our ability to fix it, and of course 
judicial practice is a huge element of that. 
Just by way of some examples, I am going to 
talk about mergers, but I think the same is true of 
conduct as well — we could talk about Amex; we could 
talk about Qualcomm — but just to talk about merger 
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cases.   
To take one from the FTC, Evonik/PeroxyChem 
in February of this year was a case where we assembled 
a pretty powerful record demonstrating that the right 
way to think about market definition in a particular 
space was through the lens of supply-side 
substitutability.  It is not often seen, but the 
concept is that it is easy for firms to switch 
backwards and forwards between making red widgets and 
making blue widgets, then firms producing both of 
those things can be in the same market because it is 
easy to move between them. 
While recognizing the validity and principle 
of that theory, the court applied a very restrictive 
approach that I think in practical terms is going to 
cast a very long shadow over efforts by private 
plaintiffs or by the government to bring that kind of 
case. 
You mentioned Sabre/Farelogix.  I think that 
is a great example.  Obviously, one major theme in the 
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discussion that we will have in a minute is platform 
competition.  Aspects of the Sabre decision are very 
striking.  You have a long evidentiary record of 
parties regarding each other as competitors, the court 
even concluding that they were competitively 
significant in really distinctive ways, and then the 
court turns around and says, “But as a matter of 
antitrust law a multisided two-sided platform cannot 
compete with a single-sided business.”  That really 
strains economics and law, which I think is grounded 
in some of the more troubling aspects of Amex. 
You also mentioned Sprint/T-Mobile.  That is 
the one of some of these recent examples with which I 
am least personally familiar.  It was very clear that 
there was a pretty robust structural case at least.  I 
think there was a HHI delta of 600–700.  The court, 
looking at some combination of efficiencies and a 
weakened competitor defense and then some sort of 
institutional deference, concluded that the parties 
had successfully rebutted that structural presumption. 
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I do not have a strong view and I am not 
sophisticated enough in the details of that case to 
have a strong view about the bottom line.  But I will 
say (1) weakened competitor defenses are ten a penny 
before the agencies; and (2) when it comes to 
efficiencies, we usually require pretty significant 
showings of efficiency in order to offset a strong 
structural case. 
I think those are a good selection of 
examples.  If I were going to add one more, I would 
add the AT&T/Time Warner merger, but I am cognizant of 
time, so let me hand back the baton. 
MR. SOVEN:  I appreciate it.  All good 
there. 
As I have signaled to my panelists, we are 
going to pivot a little bit.  We have been dancing 
around killer acquisitions, nascent acquisitions, 
speculative merger cases, so I am going to ask all of 
the panelists to comment on that topic.  They can 
comment both rhetorically and substantively.  
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Rhetorically, if you have a favorite label to give 
these, by all means, this is a good opportunity to 
stake your claim as to the right term of art.  More to 
the point, what do you think about them?   
To kick it off, the way I think about these, 
for what it’s worth, is Bill Baer testified just a few 
days ago before Congress that it is virtually 
impossible under U.S. law to win one of those cases.  
Now, he didn’t really say why.  My explanation of 
“why” is there are usually probabilistic bets that you 
could tell a story that a large technology company — 
including some of the ones we are talking about — is 
buying something that could six years down the road 
with a 10 percent probability be a really big deal and 
be disruptive; or there is a 90 percent chance nothing 
is going to happen — nothing is going to happen if no 
merger happens and nothing is going to happen if the 
company buys it. 
I think that issue has been both challenging 
for the U.S. enforcement agencies as to whether to 
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bring the case or not and even more challenging for 
courts as to what to do with that. 
Isabelle, you have talked about those and 
you alluded to those in your comments.  Why don’t I 
kick it back to you? 
MS. DE SILVA:  Thank you, Josh. 
I think first there is the issue of whether 
we are able to look at those mergers.  We talked 
already about Article 22 of the Merger Regulation 
2004. 
We also did some proposals at the national 
level that were twofold.  The first one was to create 
an ex post merger control, which would be quite close 
to the one you have in the United States or in other 
countries in Europe, to look at those mergers.  The 
second was to create a new mandatory obligation for 
some big platforms to inform us of all the 
acquisitions that they do.  That doesn’t mean that 
each and every acquisition should be notified 
formally, but at least to give us this information 
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about what types of companies they buy. 
I think one of the most difficult questions 
is: How do we analyze those cases and which are the 
cases which should be blocked? 
We set up a number of questions related to 
that in a paper we published a few months ago about 
competition issues in digital.  We set up a list of 
the questions that seem most important for us. 
One was when we do competition analysis, how 
do we take into account the nonprice parameters?  
This, in a way, should be the simplest question, but 
it still needs to be said that we have a lot of tools 
for impact on price but we do not have as many tools 
for impact on privacy or quality of service, so that 
can remain a challenge. 
The second question is: Should we take a 
longer timeframe into account?  I alluded to that 
already.  Should we go to a five-year timeframe to 
have a broader perspective?  Of course, it is more 
difficult to predict what is five years away than two 
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years away. 
Another point we really underlined is that 
new criteria are becoming crucial.  I am thinking 
about the use of data and how a merger can impact the 
community of users.  I think that in that respect the 
acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp by Facebook are 
really very good examples of the types of advantages 
that come from buying a company  that was thought to 
be in a different market than that of Facebook when it 
was bought and now today we see that those three 
services are completely merging.  They remain 
different, but they are merging even in terms of 
messaging applications. 
I think we must look very closely to see how 
we can decide which mergers should be blocked.  I 
think that one of the key criteria, for me at least, 
is: Is their position going to entrench the position 
of the dominant or very strong company in a way that 
would substantially lessen the competition in one or 
several digital markets?  That is one of the questions 
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that we need to ask. 
Also we propose in our paper the fact that 
we should take into account behavioral remedies.  They 
might be in some cases quite fit for some digital 
mergers. 
We have a case today that has been dealt 
with at the European level that raises some of these 
questions, Google/Fitbit.  I will only mention it by 
name because a lot of those questions I mentioned 
arise in that case, especially the use of data and how 
it can impact the position in the market of using 
health data to create value.  So you see that those 
questions that we raise are not theoretical; they are 
today the questions that need to be answered to define 
if we say “yes” or “no” to this type of merger. 
MR. SOVEN:  Thanks very much. 
Bruce, I’m hearing some risk in those 
remarks for U.S. companies.  Let me ask you the 
question this way, but given that we are in the debate 
season you should feel free to answer it the way you 
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wish to answer it. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  Can I interrupt you too? I’m 
just kidding. 
MR. SOVEN:  Yes, absolutely.  I should 
underscore that I am saying this all in the most 
apolitical way in all respects. 
The challenge again is a bunch of these 
deals seem to create, let’s say, a 20 percent chance 
of a problem.  My question to you is: If that is 
right, is that unlawful under the U.S. antitrust laws; 
and, if it is not, should it be?  What members of 
Congress and a bunch of people seem to be saying is, 
“Look, we hear you — we can’t prove it — we hear you 
the risk may not trip the threshold.  But we think 
overall the aggregate problem is so big that we should 
bump the standard down and not take the chance.” 
MR. HOFFMAN:  Josh, I think there is a huge 
risk here to the economy at large.  I will start by 
saying I don’t think there is anything wrong 
conceptually with the idea of nascent acquisitions 
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being problematic, or killer acquisitions or whatnot.  
I have spoken about this a lot, I have a lot 
of stuff out there, so I won’t waste everybody’s time 
by reiterating things I have previously said, other 
than to say that these are certainly areas where the 
agencies have taken action. 
I will say I thought Bill Baer’s comments 
were interesting and they underscore for me a couple 
of points that get to the risk that I want to 
highlight.   
There is not an empirical basis to say there 
are a large number of acquisitions of nascent 
competitors that should have been blocked and weren’t 
and that caused competitive harm.  There is no 
evidence to support that proposition, period, full 
stop.   
It is a myth.  It is something that people 
have just said as if it was true without providing any 
evidence to support it.  And when they are asked for 
evidence, they usually cite one specific merger or 
 53 
 
 
 
 
another specific merger which when they have been 
studied have generally been unable to conclude by any 
kind of rigorous analysis whether in fact that prior 
acquisition was actually anticompetitive. 
So the theory is certainly sound — there 
could be anticompetitive acquisitions of nascent 
competitors — but there is no empirical evidence that 
this is a widespread problem.  Nor, parenthetically, 
is there any such evidence in relation to “digital 
platforms” or “digital companies” — whatever that 
means, by the way, because I think a lot of the 
companies that get lumped into that category have lots 
of differences — but the mere fact that those firms 
have made a lot of acquisitions does not tell you 
anything about whether those acquisitions were pro- or 
anticompetitive. 
My next point — getting back to the risk — 
the idea that you change the enforcement calculus here 
so that we should more aggressively prohibit mergers 
that we do not know were anticompetitive or don’t know 
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if they are likely to be anticompetitive strikes me as 
foolhardy to say the least for a number of reasons. 
First point:  A lot of what you hear today 
sounds like “Efficiencies Offense Part 2” — “This 
acquisition is going to make this firm a much better 
competitor.  It is going to serve its customers 
better.  It is going to give them better products.  
They are going to really like it.  They will become 
more loyal.” 
“This is bad.  We should stop it.” 
Wait.  Why?  If it is providing better 
services, better goods, making its customers happier 
so they are more likely to stay with it, how did that 
become a bad thing?  This turns forty years of 
antitrust on its head. 
So we need to be very careful about 
confusing efficiencies offense with actual 
anticompetitive effects. 
Second point: If you do not know if the 
acquisition is likely to be anticompetitive, why 
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should you stop it?  If it truly is anticompetitive, 
we can always go back — the agencies do challenge 
consummated mergers and you have Section 2 as a 
backstop.  There are mechanisms by which you can deal 
with problems after the fact.  If you cannot predict 
confidently ahead of time or even with some degree of 
error ahead of time that the merger is going to be 
anticompetitive, the notion you should stop it I think 
is highly problematic. 
Third point:  A policy like that has 
potentially substantial effects on the markets both 
for funding for innovation and on innovation itself.  
If you make it very difficult for startups to be 
acquired, you are going to reduce the capital 
available for startups, and that will have negative 
effects on innovation.  I think that effect needs to 
be taken carefully into account. 
MR. SOVEN:  That was clear and to the point.  
I’ve got it.  Helpful. 
Axel, if I am in Europe I am still worried.  
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In the United States we have a challenging landscape.  
I think your competitive landscape or enforcement 
landscape is logarithmically more complex.  
Notwithstanding that the probability of a negative 
outcome for one of these acquisitions may be low, it 
seems like there is a lot to think about strategically 
when counseling clients in Europe.  What are your 
thoughts on that? 
MR. SCHULZ:  I just want to add with regard 
to the nascent competition debate, which is currently 
in a way starting only, similar types of problems have 
been addressed already for quite a while by the 
European Commission and other European agencies under 
the label of “pipeline overlaps” or “innovation.” 
You will remember that for many, many years 
now the European Commission has looked into particular 
pharma cases, and they also looked into not only 
products on the market and whether there were overlaps 
with relation to those products, but also pipeline 
products.  In particular, it used to be pipeline 
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products in Phase III development, pretty advanced, a 
year or so before launch.  That was totally accepted. 
Then came down Dow/DuPont with the concept 
of innovation.   There was the idea of “Oh, there’s a 
lot of innovation.  There are a lot of R&D people in 
the lab.  Over time, somehow, they will come up with 
something smart.  If we have two companies with a lot 
of R&D people and scientists, then chances are that 
the one-plus-one, the two together, will be even 
stronger.”  The result is known. 
This concept is not really entirely new.  It 
is just now merging over to the digital industry.  
That seems to be the new element here. 
MR. SOVEN:  That is a really relevant point 
and it’s a good segue to Daniel.  The FTC has 
responsibility for pharma and life sciences and 
medical devices. 
Daniel, Axel’s point is competition lawyers 
both in the public sector and private sector always 
want to say they are coming up with something new and 
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in fact we have come up a new way to invent the wheel. 
The flip side is all of this is the same 
only with a different title.  Those who do pharma work 
have been worried about pipeline production in terms 
of the FTC’s scrutiny — “Well, it’s Phase II, Phase 
III; where are we?”  The Commission has done a lot of 
work stopping a lot of transactions or modifying 
transactions for products that haven’t come close to 
the market. 
More generally, what is your take on the 
issue?  Do you see a distinction between tech and 
pharma or pretty much are the tools we have good? 
MR. FRANCIS:  Again there is a lot there.  
Let me start by saying a couple of things.  Just to be 
clear, I know others have touched on specific 
companies or specific investigations, but I shouldn’t 
be understood to be talking about any of that and I am 
not going to talk about specific thresholds or tests.  
Let me say two things to start. 
(1)  To agree with Bruce, if there is a 
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systematic claim that there is a programmatic failure 
of antitrust enforcement to respond to a set of 
phenomena that are widespread in practice and harmful 
in practice, that is an empirical claim that requires 
proof that I have never seen.  So I agree with that as 
an observation about a programmatic historical failing 
of antitrust. 
(2) But, to disagree with Bruce, I do not 
think that, at least in its most interesting form, 
this question is a question about making antitrust law 
more aggressive either in general or as applied to 
some sector that we might call the “tech sector” — I’m 
not sure what that is or how to define it — or 
“nascent acquisitions.” 
I think this is in its most interesting form 
a question about how to apply the antitrust laws and 
standards that we already have and for which we spend 
so much time emphasizing to the market, to others, 
their flexibility and their sensitivity to deal with 
real competitive problems on familiar theories in 
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markets across the economy. 
I think Axel touches on something really 
important when he emphasizes the consistency of this 
project with what antitrust enforcers have been doing 
for a long time.  Our orienting concerns are always 
anticompetitive agreements; anticompetitive exclusion 
by dominant firms, by single firms with monopoly 
power; and anticompetitive acquisitions.  Same here as 
in any other context. 
Everybody agrees that the acquisition of a 
competitor can be — sometimes is — unlawful, the 
paradigm of anticompetitive conduct directed at a 
promising or significant competitor to remove them.  
So the question that we are talking about here is how 
to apply that very familiar rule in settings where the 
full scale of the competitive threat of either the 
target or the acquirer, because it is not always the 
case that the incipient party is the target in markets 
such as these.  I’d say a couple of brief things about 
that. 
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First, Uncertainty of this kind is familiar 
to us.  It is a part of the competitive process.  In 
fact, the fact that competitive trajectories and 
competitive effects are unpredictable is a huge part 
of what we value about competition in the first place. 
But it is true, I think, that in digital 
markets, and in some of the markets that we have been 
talking about today, some of that complexity and 
unpredictability is particularly pronounced — 
particularly nonprice effects, which can sometimes be 
difficult to identify or measure. Let me agree with 
Isabelle’s observation that we really would appreciate 
some better tools for measuring and talking in an 
organized way about some of these things that are not 
easily quantifiable in our familiar ways. 
This unpredictability flows from 
unpredictable competitive trajectories, complexity of 
nonprice effects, and also the fact that in markets 
that are distinguished by strong network effects some 
of the most significant competitive threats may come 
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from products or services that are not close like-for-
like substitutes of the dominant incumbent. 
This is a huge policy question, and in 
responding to it I am going to just identify a couple 
of guideposts that I find quite helpful. 
(1) Just to emphasize, I think this is about 
how we apply our existing standards; it is not about 
special pleading for tech or for nascent competition.  
It is not about increasing the aggression of our 
antitrust standards; it is about applying them. 
(2)  We start, as we always do, from faith 
in the competitive process.  We know that in cases 
where there is a very close tie between the 
competitive process on the one hand and a static 
reduction in marginal cost on the other, our baseline 
preference is for competition.    
That is particularly important in the 
acquisition context.  When we are talking about 
conduct, often the hardest question is: Defendant is 
doing practice XYZ.  Should we think of that as merits 
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competition or should we think of that as something 
else?  That is not typically the question on the table 
when we are dealing with an acquisition.   
There is great language in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines that says something like “the 
antitrust laws give the competitive process, not 
operational efficiency, primacy in protecting 
consumers.”  I find that a very helpful guidepost. 
(3) Bruce talked, I think very importantly, 
about error costs and our risks of chilling all kinds 
of procompetitive activity in the economy.  I 
wholeheartedly agree, but I often think we talk 
asymmetrically about error costs and chilling.  I 
think there are error costs to inaction — in 
tolerating harm to consumers, harm to competitors, 
harm to potential innovation, and in chilling 
investment and entry and innovation in the markets 
that are affected by anticompetitive conduct.  So I 
there are error costs and there are risks of chilling 
on both sides.  
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(4) In this case and in this setting, as in 
all our others, ordinary course evidence is a very 
helpful guide. Understanding what monopolists, merging 
parties, defendants, or companies actually expected, 
actually intended, based on their irreplicable market 
knowledge that we as regulators cannot hope to 
generate ourselves is a very helpful guide in close 
cases where we otherwise find ourselves less certain 
than we would like to be. 
Let me stop there. 
MR. SOVEN:  Thanks very much, Daniel. 
Our panel, predictably, has done a fantastic 
job covering almost all the topics we planned to talk 
about.  There are a few we do not have time for. 
I think we would be remiss in ending if we 
do not touch upon what has been an enormous drumbeat 
in the United States over the last twelve to twenty-
four months of vertical mergers.  The agencies issued 
new Vertical Merger Guidelines.  Some thought they 
were great; some thought there wasn’t enough in them.  
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People have been asking for guidance. 
I will throw out as a proposition that I, 
perhaps simplistically, have never thought this 
concept was particularly complicated, at least in the 
United States.  In the United States, if you have a 
really big durable market share and you do a vertical 
acquisition or engage in a collusionary conduct in 
which the anticompetitive effects are pretty clear, 
and the apple pie story is slim to nonexistent, you 
lose, and you lose consistently, and you lose no 
matter who is running the agencies.  Some people may 
think that’s right some people may think that’s wrong, 
but that is really what has been going on if you look 
at the data. But maybe that’s not right. 
Let me allow everybody a few moments to talk 
about what is a complex subject, recognizing that, and 
end on let’s think vertical. 
Isabelle, again I will start with you. 
MS. DE SILVA:  At least at the national and 
European level, we look at vertical mergers with the 
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idea that if there is a serious risk, then we will be 
able either to block the merger or to have serious 
commitments. 
For me, the most topical case in recent 
years was a case that involved the broadcasting 
industry, Canal Plus/TPS, which really was one of the 
biggest decisions in which the company had to comply 
with a very wide set of structural commitments to be 
allowed to go through with the merger.  We now have 
some years to look back at that decision and see 
whether it was correct.  This decision was confirmed 
by the Supreme Administrative Court.  The idea is that 
this decision did a lot of good in terms of protecting 
those that might have been impacted by this vertical 
integration. 
So I have to say that in our view this type 
of case can cause serious difficulties for the 
companies and they should be aware when they consider 
this type of merger that there will be difficulties 
with the competition authorities. 
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MR. SOVEN:  Thank you. 
Bruce, I think you may have a double-header 
today, so let me ask you to go ahead in case you have 
to jump. 
MR. HOFFMAN:  I will just make a couple of 
quick points. 
One is, Josh, I will actually give a slight 
caveat to the point you made.  As Dan O’Brien observed 
once, in vertical mergers the potential for 
procompetitive benefit is isomorphic with the 
conditions that you highlight as potentially creating 
the risk of anticompetitive effect.  So I think it is 
just not the case that we can say in vertical, as we 
can in horizontal, bigger share equals bigger problem.  
In fact, often the inverse is true. 
Second, I think the Vertical Merger 
Guidelines that came out are an enormously important 
step forward.  They are not perfect — nothing ever is 
— but compared to what we had before they are 
enormously better.  
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Third, I think they recognize a critical 
point.  They talk about it mostly in connection with 
elimination of double marginalization (EDM), but it is 
a really critical point that the Guidelines identify 
and that I think bears some real careful thinking 
about.  That is, in vertical mergers, unlike in 
horizontal mergers, the mechanism by which output 
restrictions or price increases upstream translate 
into the required downstream harm — remember the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines specify that downstream 
harm is required because otherwise we just have rent 
transfers and nobody cares about that — but the 
mechanism by which those harms translate downstream is 
exactly the same as the mechanism by which benefits 
translate downstream.  In other words, unlike in 
horizontal mergers, the passthrough of harm is 
identical to the passthrough of efficiency or benefit. 
So in a vertical merger under the new 
Vertical Merger Guidelines, unlike in a horizontal 
merger, the treatment of efficiency passthrough and 
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harm passthrough is symmetric, as it should be because 
that is the correct economic framework. 
I will leave those bombshells to let 
everybody debate while I bail out to go to another 
thing I have to attend.  My apologies.  This has been 
great.  Thank you all very much. 
MR. SOVEN:  Awesome.  Thanks so much. 
To be clear, the big is not the dispositive 
factor in the out comes of U.S. vertical cases, be 
they mergers or conduct cases.  Big and durable, as it 
should be, is a prerequisite, but the only cases in 
which we have had adverse findings under the U.S. 
antitrust laws have been cases where there has been a 
clear showing of anticompetitive effects — and, 
frankly, the parties really haven’t had much to put 
forward in terms of procompetitive effects. 
In the parts of the Microsoft case that 
Microsoft lost they really did not have very much. In 
Dentsply and cases like that, they were all pretty 
straightforward that “These are a problem and we are 
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not seeing an efficiency story.” 
MR. SOVEN:  Axel, appropriate for a European 
conference, let me flip it back to you. 
MR. SCHULZ:  Probably not time to say very 
much, but I think Isabelle has already touched upon 
the important points. 
In Europe the review of vertical mergers is 
maybe more prominent than in the United States.  In 
the United States, it is more of an oddity I 
understand.  In Europe, it is more prevalent and there 
have been more cases in which vertical relations are 
being reviewed.  There have been quite a number of 
cases. 
Maybe one is really quite interesting, 
EssilorLuxottica/GrandVision.  I think the clock has 
been stopped for the third time now.  There had been 
the precursor to that case two years ago when Essilor 
and Luxottica merged, and that was somewhat a 
conglomerate/vertical merger.  One was producing the 
lenses for glasses and the other one was producing the 
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frames.  So is it vertical, is it conglomerate, or 
somewhere in between? 
Interestingly, that case had already gone 
into Phase II in-depth investigation. It was a huge 
investigation — I think 4000 opticians had been 
consulted — because the two companies in their 
respective markets were the market leaders.  But also 
their market shares were not above 20 percent in each 
of their respective markets, so it was not ultimately 
a big deal, and the deal was cleared. 
Now EssilorLuxottica is trying to acquire 
GrandVision. GrandVision is a retail outlet with, I 
believe, 4000 stores or something like that.  
EssilorLuxottica has its own 1000 stores.  I don’t 
know the facts so I cannot really comment, but it 
seems that the clock is stopped for the third time, so 
it seems to be a bit more problematic to get that 
approved. 
I really ought to say again that in Europe 
vertical mergers are being looked at routinely. 
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MR. SOVEN:  Daniel, you get the challenge 
again of wrapping up a complex subject in just a 
minute or two.  Go ahead. 
MR. FRANCIS:  I am not sure I have anything 
particularly interesting to add to the thoughtful 
comments we have just heard.   
I think everyone understands that vertical 
transactions, just like horizontal deals, can be 
harmful, but perhaps in some ways that are specific to 
vertical deals the analysis can be more complex. 
Bruce mentioned that foreclosure and EDM are 
two sides of the same coin.  I would add by way of a 
footnote to that that foreclosure is not the only 
story of harm in a vertical transaction.  Access to 
competitively sensitive information and coordinated 
effects are things that I think we should take 
seriously in the vertical context.  This is not a 
“one-trick pony” in some sense.  But otherwise I think 
his points and those of others are well taken. 
Also, by way of echoing something that 
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others have said, in the vertical transaction context 
a big challenge for companies and others, including 
private plaintiffs and agencies, is the relative lack 
of clear guidance from the enforcement architecture.  
I think it is wonderful that now, after so 
many years, we have Vertical Merger Guidelines out 
there.  The agencies have spoken, but now it is over 
to the courts and to the diet of cases that will flow 
through the agencies under these Guidelines. 
Like everyone else, and to recall one of our 
earlier discussions, it will be very interesting to 
see what the courts now do. 
MR. SOVEN:  Yes.  I think what is clear from 
this fantastic panel and the great comments of the 
panelists is that we are not even close to the end of 
history in competition enforcement in the merger 
sphere. 
Again I want to thank the panel for their 
work and effort.   
I’ll flip it over to you, James. 
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MR. KEYTE:  Thank you so much.  What an 
excellent panel.   
It has been a great first day so far, with 
the tech panel, the mergers panel, the keynote 
speakers and discussion. 
Normally, what I would do now is to invite 
everybody to exit the room and go get some food and a 
glass of wine.  I will ask everybody to go get some 
food and a glass of wine or something else that you 
want to drink and then click back into our Plenary 
Networking Session, where you get to network. You can 
sit at tables.  You can get up and go to other tables 
and meet people.  You can find people.  We will open 
that up right away so you can do that glass in hand.  
You just can’t share anything. 
We will have a Fireside Chat after about ten 
or twenty minutes of that with Barry Hawk, the founder 
of the Institute — and everybody knows Barry — and the 
iconic Bill Kovacic.  That will be an interesting 
discussion. 
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Following that, Freshfields is putting on 
its networking event in the same technology.  You have 
to exit and go back into their event. 
We hope to see a lot of you in the 
networking session to talk to Barry and Bill and then 
onward to the Freshfields event. 
